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Abstract 
While the past decade has seen a remarkable growth in research on external perceptions of the EU, this 
literature remains characterized by three important gaps: highly uneven geographical coverage, lack of 
comparisons between the EU and other actors, and a near-exclusive focus on description to the 
detriment of explanation. This article introduces a novel explanatory framework for perceptions 
research and applies this to popular perceptions of the EU and China in 19 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, shedding light on a neglected dimension of the ‘traditional’ versus ‘emerging donors’ 
debate. It finds, first, that China has quickly succeeded in becoming more well-known among African 
populations than the EU. Second, popular perceptions do not reflect the antagonism pervading the 
discourse on ‘emerging donors’, with both the EU and China enjoying broad-based popular support. 
Finally, preferences are a function primarily of individual experiences and outlooks, refuting earlier 
claims on the importance of national-level factors. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of the way the European Union is perceived in third countries has over the last decade 
rapidly become a blossoming field of research. Scholars active in this field -while employing different 
geographical, theoretical and methodological approaches- are united by an intention to go beyond the 
‘excessively Eurocentric perspective’ that frequently characterizes existing analyses of the EU’s 
international role (Lucarelli, 2014, p. 11). By zooming in on the views of those who are at the 
‘receiving end’ of the EU’s international actions, the external perceptions literature seeks to 
complement this dominant perspective and to inject a reinforced relevance into the study of EU 
foreign policy. Studying external perceptions, it is argued, will offer a welcome check on narratives of 
the EU as a unique international actor, is a source of insight into the effectiveness of EU foreign 
policy, and can shed light on one of the constitutive elements of the EU’s international identity (Kelly 
& Smith, 2013, p. 220; Lucarelli, 2014, pp. 1-2). 
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Despite the rapid development of this field of study, major gaps still remain in the analysis of the 
external images of the EU. This article seeks to tackle three such gaps. First, its geographical focus is 
on Sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which perceptions have remained markedly underexplored. 
Second, the article introduces a much-needed comparative perspective, contrasting African 
perceptions of the EU with those of China, the most prominent of the ‘emerging players’ on the 
continent. Lastly, it goes beyond the so far dominant focus on description, by presenting a framework 
of explanatory variables and applying this to the case at hand through a multilevel analysis of 
Afrobarometer data covering 19 countries. 
 
The first part of the article reviews the scarce evidence on African perceptions of the EU. The 
following section argues why it is crucial to compare perceptions of the EU to those of other players, 
for both empirical and analytical reasons. Section three then delves deeper into explaining perceptions, 
highlighting the neglected issue of multiple levels of explanation and constructing a novel explanatory 
framework. The research questions and methodological choices are presented in section four, after 
which section five presents the analyses and discusses the main findings. 
 
 
African perceptions of the EU: a blind spot in the literature 
 
A first shortcoming of the existing literature on external perceptions of the EU is its patchy 
geographical coverage. While several authors have attempted to achieve a diverse selection of 
countries and regions (e.g. Elgström, 2007; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2010), the literature has so far 
predominantly looked at various parts of Asia and the Pacific (Chaban & Holland, 2013; Chaban & 
Magdalina, 2014; Stumbaum, 2013) and at the BRICS countries (Chaban & Elgström, 2014; Kelly & 
Smith, 2013; Mayer & Zielonka, 2012; Torney, 2014). As a corollary, many other countries have 
remained understudied. Notably rare are studies on African perceptions of the EU, a remarkable 
observation given the long history of co-operation between the two continents. As Sub-Saharan Africa 
is the destination of major EU financial resources -a fact that has given rise to an ever-changing 
sequence of co-operation paradigms- the region would appear to be a key arena for analysing the EU’s 
external image. 
 
In practice, however, extremely little is known of how Africans perceive the EU. Studies have been 
very scarce and mostly elite-focused
2
 (Elgström, 2010; Sicurelli, 2010). A downside of such elite-
centred approaches is that the resulting analyses risk insufficiently going beyond standard accounts of 
the relationship and its main bones of contention. Research focusing on the perceptions of broader 
sections of society has been limited to two countries: Kenya and South Africa (Fioramonti & 
Kimunguyi, 2011; Fioramonti & Olivier, 2007; Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008; Olivier & Fioramonti, 
2010). South Africa is typically discussed in the context of the BRICS, reflecting the fact that it can 
hardly be considered a typical case. The small number of cases has put constraints on the questions 
and hypotheses that could be addressed, and is particularly salient for the issue of multiple levels of 
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explanation introduced below. Needed, therefore, are analyses of African perceptions of the EU 
including a much larger set of countries. 
 
 
The need for a comparative perspective 
 
A second gap in the perceptions literature concerns the lack of comparative analyses. Perceptions of 
the EU have been studied in isolation, an approach that does not reflect the EU’s actual status as an 
international actor. Third countries are generally faced with a varied and sometimes increasing set of 
potential partners, making it far more meaningful to compare perceptions of the EU to those of others 
relevant actors (see also Lucarelli, 2014, p. 12). 
 
Such a comparative design is particularly relevant for the case of Africa, where the (re-)emergence of 
new players has become a hotly debated topic for academics and practitioners alike. This re-
emergence is not only presented in terms of competing economic or security interests, but as a 
competition between alternative models of development vying for the preference of African elites and 
populations. ‘China’s model’, it is argued, ‘serves as a credible alternative with regard to Africa’s 
development and political economic reforms’ (Men & Barton, 2011, p. 11). It is, therefore, remarkable 
that systematic inquiry into African perspectives on these different approaches has been absent. 
African evaluations have mostly been discussed in an anecdotal fashion (for two empirical works, see 
Fioramonti & Kimunguyi, 2011; Hanusch, 2012), leading to widely diverging conclusions. On the one 
hand, media sources often state that only African elites favour China over traditional donors, as 
China’s lack of conditionality allows them more leeway (Sautman & Yan, 2009). In contrast, it has 
also been asserted that ‘one can see why the gradualist reform and experimental pragmatism modelled 
by the Chinese are attractive to African people – not just corrupt leaders and elites’ (Mawdsley, 2008, 
p. 521). A systematic study of African evaluations has, however, not yet been carried out. 
 
In addition to becoming more attuned to reality, the EU perceptions literature could also benefit from a 
comparative perspective on an analytical level. At present, different literatures on perceptions are 
developing independently from each other, without the interaction that could breathe new life into 
existing debates. Particularly relevant for the case under study is the growing body of work on how 
African public opinion perceives China or ‘the Chinese’, which has already achieved a much broader 
geographical coverage than similar work on the EU. Its focus has varied from a narrower one on 
Chinese immigrants to more encompassing discussions of China’s presence as a whole. Most studies 
have adopted a single case study approach (see Esteban (2010) for Equatorial Guinea; Park (2013) for 
South Africa and Lesotho; Shen and Taylor (2012) for Uganda;  Sylvanus (2013) for Togo). Larger-N 
studies have been less common (Hanusch, 2012; Sautman & Yan, 2009).  
 
There has been a complete lack of attempts to build bridges between this emerging field of research 
and the burgeoning literature on external perceptions of the EU.
3
 This article aims to illustrate that 
such bridges could nevertheless prove analytically fruitful. Research on the EU’s external image has 
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developed out of discontent with the inward-looking character of much work on EU foreign policy. 
The new field of research has, however, remained firmly rooted in this existing literature, sometimes 
resulting in a very ‘European’ take on what the outside world thinks of the EU. A prominent example 
hereof is the tendency to discuss the EU’s external image in terms of its normative power status 
(Bacon & Kato, 2013; Chaban, Elgström, Kelly, & Lai, 2013; Jain & Pandey, 2013; Larsen, 2014). 
The initial question of how others see the EU then risks becoming confined to a sui generis assessment 
of whether or not others perceive the EU as the EU wants to be perceived. Developing stronger links 
with bodies of literature on perceptions of other international actors could be a step in opening up the 
focus of inquiry and formulating more general questions and hypotheses. 
 
 
Going beyond description 
 
One concrete contribution from the literature on African perceptions of China is to be found in its 
more explanatory approach. Thus far, research on EU perceptions has been mainly descriptive. As 
pointed out by Lucarelli, ‘the existent literature already makes an attempt to identify the factors that 
influence perceptions by embedding the images presented in the specific relations between the EU and 
that specific country’, but ‘the issue has not been theorized in such a way that a relation between 
different factors could be identified’ (2014, p. 12). The framework proposed by Tsuruoka (2008) and 
its revision by Chaban and Magdalina (2014) constitute the two main attempts at explanation. 
However, both focus on elite perceptions, and hence assume extensive knowledge of relations with the 
EU on the part of respondents. Discussions of public opinion, in contrast, are usually limited to 
summary statistics, detailing which proportion of the public knows the EU or evaluates it positively. In 
contrast, the literature on African perceptions of China has made progress in studying how groups 
within countries differ from each other, and which factors can explain perceptions. 
 
Multiple levels of explanation 
 
Even the literature on African perceptions of China, however, has neglected an important preliminary 
issue. This concerns the level at which explanation is to be situated and studied. While rarely explicitly 
tackled by researchers
4
, this question has crucial theoretical and methodological implications. In 
essence, there is a divide between two approaches to studying perceptions. The first focuses on 
differences in average perceptions between countries, and is thus consistent with the idea that 
perceptions are mainly determined by country-level factors. These may include general characteristics 
of the country itself, of its international relations, and of political or media discourses at the national 
level. In this vein, Sautman and Yan concluded that ‘the dominant variation in African perspectives 
[on China-Africa links] is by country, compared with variations such as age, education and gender’ 
(2009, p. 728).  
 
The second approach focuses on explanatory variables situated at a lower level, assuming that 
perceptions are primarily influenced by characteristics of individuals, their day-to-day experiences, 
and beliefs and attitudes. For the sake of clarity and brevity, this article uses the term ‘individual-level 
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factors’. It should be noted, however, that these characteristics are often not purely individual, but 
rather (partly) shared within a variety of smaller social groupings. An illustration of this focus can 
hence be found in the work of Esteban on Equatorial Guinea, in which the author argues that ‘acute 
divergences emerge among different strata of Equatoguinean society in their evaluation of the 
increasing links between their country and China’ (2010, p. 248). 
 
The issue of multiple levels of explanation is part of a larger conundrum, which is central to the study 
of external perceptions but has received limited attention. This is the question of exactly which 
dynamics are being captured by ‘external perceptions’ (and the various operationalizations of this 
term). Rather than merely a matter of definitions, this question has important implications for the 
justifications for perceptions research. Thus far, these have been mostly of an intuitive nature.
5
 They 
can be summarized as follows: ‘perceptions can act as a fruitful resource to systematically evaluate the 
EU, providing insight into the effectiveness of EU international action from the perspective of 
outsiders’ (Kelly & Smith, 2013, p. 220). Such statements are, however, dependent upon important 
assumptions regarding how perceptions come about and what exactly it is they capture. As illustrated 
by the discussion of multiple levels of explanation, this aspect of perceptions cannot be taken for 
granted, especially for the case of public opinion
6
. Popular perceptions may reflect an international 
actor’s impact on the lives of individuals, but may also simply echo discourses formulated by national 
elites, or be influenced by other factors that have not yet received attention. A more thorough 
reflection on the origins of (popular) perceptions is thus needed, in order to substantiate claims on 
what perceptions research can contribute to the study of international relations and foreign policy. 
 
Towards a framework for explanation 
 
This article contributes to such a reflection by constructing a framework of explanatory variables, 
thereby paying particular attention to the issue of multiple levels of explanation. To achieve a more 
comprehensive framework, hypotheses are drawn both from work on perceptions of the EU and China 
and from the more general literature on EU-Africa and China-Africa relations. 
 
For both the national and the individual level of explanation, two types of variables are discussed. On 
the one hand, general characteristics of countries and individuals may have an impact on perceptions 
of an international actor. On the other hand, perceptions may be influenced by the relationship with 
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that particular actor.
7
 The resulting explanatory framework, which is presented in Table 1, thus 
consists of four categories.
8
 
 
Table 1: Explaining African perceptions of development partners 
 General characteristics Relation-specific characteristics 
Country level 
characteristics 
Level of economic development 
Type of political regime 
Politicisation of the relationship as an electoral 
issue by national politicians 
Media messages 
Historical relationship with the partner 
Current trade and investment relations with the 
partner 
Current aid/development relations with the 
partner 
Individual level 
characteristics 
Socio-economic status 
Occupation 
Urban vs. rural area 
Media consumption 
Gender 
Age 
Education 
Importance attached to democracy 
Importance attached to civil-political human 
rights  
View on donor influence 
Importance attached to infrastructure 
   
Analyses of African perceptions of China have dedicated considerable attention to relation-specific 
characteristics at the country level. Based upon a survey of university students and staff in nine 
African countries, Sautman and Yan concluded that variation in perceptions is mainly located at the 
country-level. They further argued that since the nature of countries’ interactions with China is fairly 
similar across Africa, variations in perceptions ‘are primarily a function of the extent to which national 
politicians have elected to raise “the Chinese problem” and, secondarily, the extent of Western media 
influence in African states’ (2009, p. 728). 
 
Questioning these authors’ assertion that bilateral relations are too uniform to explain variation in 
perceptions, Esteban argued that ‘the historical relation between China and each individual African 
country mediates the African citizens’ assessment of the current Chinese presence on the continent’ 
(2010, p. 234). Similarly, Park focused on the role of historical ties and national memory in explaining 
differing perceptions of the Chinese in South Africa and Lesotho (2013). Complementing such work 
on historical ties, Hanusch looked at contemporary trade and investment relations, finding evidence 
for a relationship between higher levels of imports from China and less favourable attitudes towards 
China’s presence. His analysis also mentioned the potential impact of Chinese development aid, but 
was unable to include this factor due to the lack of reliable data on Chinese aid (Hanusch, 2012). 
 
Less attention has gone to general characteristics at the country level, such as the level of economic 
development or the type of political regime. It seems plausible, however, that such characteristics also 
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influence perceptions of international actors. More specifically, they might fulfil an intermediary role, 
reducing or enhancing the effect of other explanatory variables. 
 
At the individual level, both general and relation-specific characteristics have received attention within 
the China-Africa literature. Regarding general characteristics of individuals, the most common 
argument focuses on individuals’ socio-economic position, as this mediates how people experience the 
Chinese presence. An oft-heard yet simplistic version of this argument identifies a binary between a 
ruling elite (allied to China) and the majority of the population (Sautman & Yan, 2009, p. 734). A 
more sophisticated account differentiates between the perceptions of consumers, small entrepreneurs, 
businessmen and landlords (Esteban, 2010). A related variable that has not yet received attention is 
whether respondents live in an urban or a rural area, as this also influences whether and how they 
encounter particular international actors. 
 
Another relevant characteristic at the individual level is respondents’ media consumption. Shen and 
Taylor found for Ugandan youths that ‘the more reliant on local media the respondents are, the more 
they worry about their personal insecurity in the wake of China’s expanding economic role’ (2012, p. 
708). In contrast, Hanusch found a positive yet weak relationship between evaluations of China’s 
engagement and the frequency of obtaining news from radio, television and newspapers (2012). 
 
The relationship between perceptions and more basic individual characteristics has also been studied. 
Age does not appear to have a clear impact on perceptions of China. The role of education remains 
subject to debate. Shen and Taylor found a highly significant positive correlation between a lower 
level of education and the perception that Chinese workers have taken away Ugandan jobs (Shen & 
Taylor, 2012). Other studies, however, did not find a consistent influence of education (Hanusch, 
2012; Sautman & Yan, 2009). The effect of gender has been less ambiguous, with women consistently 
expressing more negative perceptions of China than men (Hanusch, 2012; Sautman & Yan, 2009). 
 
While such general characteristics of respondents have been studied fairly extensively, relation-
specific individual characteristics have received less attention. This fourth category is nevertheless 
highly interesting, as it deals with how perceptions are influenced by attitudes on topics of direct 
relevance to the relationship with a particular actor. Hanusch carried out the most systematic study of 
such factors, finding strong evidence that respondents who attach major importance to civil and 
political human rights have significantly more negative perceptions of China (2012). 
 
This article introduces two additional hypotheses on relation-specific individual characteristics, drawn 
from the literature on traditional versus emerging development partners. First, one of the most noted 
features of the Chinese engagement with Africa is the absence of political conditionality, which sets it 
apart from traditional OECD-DAC involvement (Brautigam, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized here that African citizens who feel that international donors have too strong an influence 
on their government will have a stronger preference for China. The second hypothesis is related to 
China’s focus on infrastructure development, which has for several decades been quite marginal in the 
aid of traditional donors. As stressed by Ogunleye, ‘physical infrastructure development remains the 
most important engagement through which Chinese presence could be felt in Africa’ (2011, p. 227). It 
has been speculated that this high visibility of infrastructure support makes it an important factor in the 
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creation of (positive) African perceptions of the Chinese engagement (Holslag, 2011, p. 5). It is 
expected, therefore, that respondents who see infrastructure development as a priority will express a 
stronger preference for China. 
 
In summary, the literature on African perceptions of China has made far stronger progress in 
explaining perceptions than its EU-focused counterpart. Efforts are still fragmented but can feed into 
an explanatory framework with more general applicability, especially when combined with insights 
from other relevant sets of literature. The following sections present an empirical exploration of the 
resulting framework. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to move beyond the three shortcomings of the perceptions literature outlined earlier, this 
article addresses the following research questions: 
1) How do African populations evaluate the contribution to development of the European Union? 
2) How does this compare to their evaluation of China’s contribution? 
3) Which level, i.e. the national or the individual level, is most important in accounting for variations 
in these perceptions and preferences? 
4) Which (general or relation-specific) variables can account for variations in preferences? 
  
The analysis is based upon a quantitative comparative approach including 19 countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
9
, as this allows for studying the impact of both national-level and individual-level variables. 
While the countries constitute a varied group in terms of GDP per capita, colonial history and 
geographical location, there is a lack of Central-African countries, since instability in the region has 
hindered systematic data collection. Data was taken from Round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey 
(conducted in 2008), which to date remains the only large-scale source of information on how African 
populations evaluate the development support of several international actors
10
. As China’s engagement 
with Africa (re)gained momentum after the year 2000 (and especially after 2006), the data capture 
African popular perceptions at a fairly early stage. The Afrobarometer surveys are based upon 
randomly drawn national probability samples, with a total sample size of 26,513 respondents
11
 
(Afrobarometer Network, 2007; Hanusch, 2012). 
 
                                                          
9
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
10
 The unavailability of earlier or more recent data also implies that it was not possible to add a longitudinal 
dimension to the analysis. 
11
 The Afrobarometer project is based upon a partnership between the Center for Democratic Development 
(Ghana), the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (Benin), the Institute for Development 
Studies (Kenya), and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (South Africa). It is supported by Michigan 
State University and the University of Cape Town, as well as by an International Advisory Board of academics. 
Its methodology is well-elaborated and has been developed since the first Afrobarometer round in 1999. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that a measure of caution is still called for when dealing with survey data 
obtained in the challenging research context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
9 
 
The Afrobarometer asked respondents about their evaluation of various international actors through 
the following question: “In your opinion, how much do each of the following do to help your country, 
or haven’t you heard enough to say?”12 Reponses take the form of a four-point scale (0 = do nothing, 
1 = help a little, 2 = help somewhat, 3 = help a lot), which is treated here as interval. To answer the 
comparative research question, a second measure is used which captures the difference in scores 
accorded to the EU and China by each respondent. This variable hence ranges from -3 (strong 
preference for China) to 3 (strong preference for the EU), with zero indicating a lack of preference. 
 
The first two research questions are answered through a descriptive exploration of the variables 
capturing perceptions and preference, carried out with SPSS. The third and fourth research questions 
are approached through a series of multilevel models estimated using MLwiN, with complete case 
analysis to allow for straightforward model comparison. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
An important first question concerns the extent to which the EU and China are known to African 
populations. The most consistent finding to arise from the literature is that ‘knowledge of the EU in 
non-European countries is not very great’ (Lucarelli, 2014, p. 7). While it may be expected that this 
finding will be reproduced for Sub-Saharan Africa, it is less predictable how the EU will fare vis-à-vis 
China. Compared to the long history of EU engagement, China’s large-scale presence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is fairly recent. China is, however, renowned for quickly having achieved a high visibility, 
among others through support for infrastructure projects (Foster, Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak, 2008). 
 
Table 2: Respondents who felt they knew enough about the EU/China to answer the question (%) 
Country EU  China  Difference 
Benin 55.7 65 - 9.3 
Botswana 62.3 77.6 - 15.3 
Burkina Faso 61 64 - 3 
Cape Verde 76.1 84.4 - 8.3 
Kenya 69.8 73.7 - 3.9 
Lesotho 53.6 81.4 - 27.8 
Liberia 85.4 90.1 - 4.7 
Madagascar 57 60.1 - 3.1 
Malawi 39.2 41.7 - 2.5 
Mali 74.2 82.8 - 8.6 
Mozambique 56.5 68.4 - 11.9 
Namibia 83.3 92.7 - 9.4 
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Nigeria 65.6 66 - 0.4 
Senegal 51.5 67.6 - 16.1 
South Africa 52.6 57.8 - 5.2 
Tanzania 70.4 69.8 + 0.6 
Uganda 60.5 60 + 0.5 
Zambia 50.3 69 - 18.7 
Zimbabwe 52 74.4 - 22.4 
Average 61.95 70.87 - 8.92 
N = 26,513 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 
 
 
Table 2 presents the relevant Afrobarometer results. As expected, the EU is not very well known in 
most countries, with on average almost four out of ten respondents indicating that they do not know 
enough about the EU to evaluate its help. Results vary quite strongly over countries, ranging from 
Liberia and Namibia at one extreme (where less than two out of ten gave a ‘don’t know’ answer) to 
Malawi at the other (where more than 60 per cent of respondents did). The most striking finding, 
however, comes from the comparison with China. In seventeen out of nineteen countries, China’s 
impact on the country is better known by the population than that of the EU. The difference is often 
considerable, surpassing 15 per cent in five cases. This indicates that by 2008, China had already built 
up a clear profile in Africa, while the EU continues to struggle in this field after decades of co-
operation. 
 
Positive versus negative evaluations 
 
China’s strong lead over the EU in terms of being known by the population does not necessarily entail 
a higher degree of support for its activities. To the contrary, the higher percentage of Africans with a 
clear opinion on China’s support might reflect the prevalence of outspokenly negative appraisals. 
Table 3, therefore, presents the scores given by those who felt they knew enough to evaluate the 
actors. In all 19 countries combined, 37.8 per cent of respondents indicated that the EU ‘helps a lot’, 
the most positive evaluation that could be given. A further 32.2 per cent said the EU ‘helps 
somewhat’. Only 11.3 per cent of the respondents gave the most negative answer of ‘does nothing, no 
help’. On the whole, therefore, the EU’s help seems to be quite highly appreciated by African 
populations
13
. There is quite a bit of variation between countries; while more than a third of South 
African respondents said the EU does nothing to help their country, in Malawi 62.3 per cent gave the 
most positive score. 
 
For China, 36.8 per cent of respondents accorded the highest score and 12.5 per cent expressed that it 
offers ‘no help’. As an additional 30.5 per cent said China ‘helps somewhat’, two thirds of respondents 
hold a positive or very positive view. This supports earlier evidence that ‘African views [on China-
Africa links] are not nearly as negative as Western media make out’ (Sautman & Yan, 2009, p. 728). 
Again, there is some variation between countries, with Uganda and South Africa reporting many 
critical assessments and Burkina Faso and Lesotho offering very positive appraisals. 
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Table 3: Respondents according the most positive and the most negative score to the EU/China (%) 
Country “does nothing, no help” “helps a lot” 
 EU China Difference EU  China  Difference 
Benin 8.1 5 + 3.1 36.2 46 - 9.8 
Botswana 4.4 4.4 0.0 49.1 54.4 - 5.3 
Burkina Faso 4.4 3.5 + 0.9 56.7 62.7 - 6 
Cape Verde 0.8 0.6 + 0.2 31.1 34.1 - 3 
Kenya 12.7 17.4 - 4.7 39.8 23.6 + 16.2 
Lesotho 11.4 14.3 - 2.9 73.4 72.8 + 0.6 
Liberia 4.9 4.7 + 0.2 54.5 54.1 + 0.4 
Madagascar 1.4 3.9 - 2.5 27.6 18.2 + 9.4 
Malawi 14 13.4 + 0.6 62.3 52.4 + 9.9 
Mali 8.9 7 + 1.9 37.6 57.3 - 19.7 
Mozambique 10.3 9.9 + 0.4 47.3 47.3 0.0 
Namibia 10.3 12.9 - 2.6 31.7 26.3 + 5.4 
Nigeria 15.7 14.4 + 1.3 21.3 20.2 + 1.1 
Senegal 15.4 11.1 + 4.3 40 49.4 - 9.4 
South Africa 35.3 28.9 + 6.4 18 14.3 + 3.7 
Tanzania 7.4 13.6 - 6.2 34.1 22.4 + 11.7 
Uganda 9.8 28.3 - 18.5 32.8 10.3 + 22.5 
Zambia 10.8 8.1 + 2.7 45.4 49.8 - 4.4 
Zimbabwe 18.9 18.1 + 0.8 28.9 28.4 + 0.5 
Average 11.3 12.5 - 1.2 37.8 36.8 + 1.0 
N = 18,424 for China and N = 16,320 for the EU 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 
 
Comparing the evaluations of both actors, what is most striking is how similar their levels of 
popularity appear to be. While there are a number of exceptions (most notably Kenya, Mali and 
Uganda), in most countries both negative and positive appraisals of the two actors are on a par.
14
 
 
Further insights can be gathered by turning from country averages to individual respondents. Figure 1 
presents the distribution of respondents’ preferences for the EU or China. By far the most prevalent 
value is 0, which represents an equal evaluation of both development partners. Scores indicating a 
strong preference for one of the two players are quite rare. This clearly sets African public opinion 
apart from the dominant antagonistic representations in both academic and media accounts, which tend 
to portray the relationship between traditional and emerging development partners as one of 
competition and conflict (Mawdsley, 2008; Men & Barton, 2011). Such binaries are certainly not 
reflected in African popular perceptions. This could indicate two things: either the approaches of the 
EU and China are not seen as very different by Africans, or they are seen as different but 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
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 This was confirmed by paired samples t-tests, which showed that the mean scores accorded to the EU and 
China do not differ significantly at the .05 level in eight out of nineteen countries. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of preferences for the EU and China 
 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 
 
Figure 1 also shows that, across all 19 countries, the EU is slightly more popular, with 23 per cent of 
respondents expressing a preference for the EU over China, while 17.8 per cent indicated that China 
helps their country more. The distribution was a lot more skewed within a number of countries, 
however. For instance, 51 per cent of Ugandan and 39.3 per cent of Namibian respondents preferred 
the EU, while 28.9 per cent in Mali said China helps more. The EU thus has a slight lead over China 
overall, but this is not the case within all of the countries under study.  
 
Explaining perceptions 
 
Moving from description to explanation, the starting point is the issue of multiple levels of explanation 
raised earlier. To reiterate, the question is whether perceptions are primarily a function of processes at 
the national level or are mainly formed at the individual level. This can be determined by estimating a 
null multilevel model, which divides the overall variance into a between-country and a within-country 
13 
 
component. The ratio of the between-country component to the overall variance (i.e. the intra-class 
correlation or ICC) provides insight into the importance of the country level in explaining variation in 
perceptions and preferences. Table 4 presents the ICC for perceptions of the EU and of China, as well 
as for preferences for one of the two actors. 
 
Table 4: Within-country versus between-country variation in perceptions and preferences 
 Perceptions of the EU Perceptions of China Preferences for the EU 
versus China 
Between-country variance 0.073 0.125 0.054 
Within-country variance 0.933 0.921 0.983 
Total variance 1.006 1.046 1.037 
ICC 7.25 % 11.95 % 5.21 % 
N = 11,736 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 
 
The results indicate that while there are significant differences in average perceptions between African 
countries (and the use of a multilevel model is hence warranted), the role of the country level is limited 
in this specific case
15
. The analysis thus provides evidence for Esteban’s argument that there are 
important differences in perceptions between various groups within the same country. In contrast, 
there is little support for the conclusion by Sautman and Yan that variation in perceptions is primarily 
located at the country level, nor for their more specific claim that popular perceptions mainly echo the 
discourse of national-level politicians. These findings point towards the limits of perceptions analyses 
focusing on country averages, which have so far formed the dominant approach. 
 
Having determined the relative importance of country-level and individual-level factors for African 
perceptions of the EU and China, the remainder of this article applies the explanatory framework 
presented above. The emphasis is on individual-level variables, as this level was found to be the most 
important for explaining perceptions in the case at hand. It should be noted that certain variables of 
interest (such as levels of aid by China) could not be included, due to the unavailability of reliable 
data. Basic descriptive statistics for each of the variables included are given in Table 5. Table 6 
presents the series of models estimated. Given the coding of the dependent variable, positive 
coefficients indicate that a variable is linked to more pro-EU attitudes.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the multilevel analysis 
Variable Min - Max Mean Std. deviation Remarks 
Individual-level     
Gender 0 - 1 0.43 0.495 0 = male, 1 = female 
Age 18 - 90 35.07 13.322 unit = years 
Income 0 - 3 1.39 0.961  
Subj. living conditions 1 - 5 2.7 1.167  
Urban 0 - 1 0.44 0.497 0 = urban, 1 = rural 
Education 0 - 9 3.78 2.001  
Media consumption 0 - 12 6.71 3.508  
Democracy priority 0 - 1 0.02 0.147 1 = democracy considered one of top 
three priorities 
Civil-political HR 3 - 15 11.63 3.943  
Infrastructure priority 0 - 3 0.57 0.716  
                                                          
15
 These results only apply to African public opinion. In the case of elite perceptions, one might expect national-
level variables to play a more substantial role. 
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Influence donors 0 - 1 0.34 0.474 1 = international donors and NGOs 
have too much influence 
     
Country-level variables     
GDP per capita 231 – 5,747 1516.75 1751.01 unit =  current US$ 2008 (World 
Bank, 2014) 
Diplomatic ties 1 – 48 31.3 12.80 unit = years of diplomatic ties with 
PRC up to 2008 
Democracy score (-4) - 10 5.3 3.79 Polity Score 2008, Polity IV Project 
(Center for Systemic Peace, 2014) 
N = 11,736 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4; Center for Systemic Peace (2014); World Bank (2014) 
 
Model 1 is a null model, which partitions the variance as discussed above (Table 4). Model 2 
introduces two general characteristics at the individual level, gender and age. In line with earlier 
findings, men are found to be significantly more pro-China. While age is initially insignificant, 
subsequent models indicate that younger people are more supportive of China. This may be linked to 
the more recent (re)emergence of China as a large-scale development partner.  
 
Model 3 includes further general characteristics at the individual level. It introduces two proxies for 
respondents’ socio-economic status. Following Hanusch (2012, p. 10), ‘income’ is a composite 
measure on the basis of a respondent’s ownership of a radio, television and motor vehicle. ‘Subjective 
living conditions’ is a score that respondents accorded to their own present living conditions. The 
effect of income is the strongest, with higher scores related to a more pro-China stance. In contrast, a 
more positive evaluation of one’s own living conditions is associated with a stronger preference for 
the EU. The findings are therefore inconclusive regarding the effect of socio-economic status, 
indicating that it should be studied in more depth. It should be noted that the two proxies do not allow 
for distinguishing between people active in different occupations or sectors, which is at the core of 
some of the arguments outlined earlier. It was hypothesized that some of this variation in respondents’ 
economic interaction with international actors might be captured in whether they live in an urban or a 
rural area, but the ‘urban’ variable introduced in Model 3 is consistently insignificant. 
 
The effect of education is significant (though not strongly) and positive, indicating that more highly 
educated Africans are somewhat more pro-EU. The last variable introduced in Model 3 is ‘media 
consumption’, which captures how frequently respondents get news from radio, television and 
newspaper sources. There is only a weak overall effect, with those who consult media sources more 
often expressing a slightly more pro-EU stance. However, as the content of media messages varies per 
country, it is not surprising that no strong effect is found for all 19 countries combined. A later model 
will therefore allow the effect of media-consumption to vary over countries. 
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Table 6: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of African popular preferences for the EU versus China 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed part Par. S.E. Par. S.E. Par. S.E. Par. S.E. Par. S.E.   
Intercept 0.056 0.054 0.011 0.061 -0.098 0.068 -0.189** 0.079 -0.095 0.168 -0.111 0.190 
Individual-level             
Gender   0.033* 0.019 0.037** 0.019 0.040** 0.019 0.040** 0.019 0.038** 0.019 
Age   0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Income     -0.027** 0.012 -0.028** 0.012 -0.028** 0.012 -0.025** 0.012 
Subjective living conditions     0.013 0.008 0.015* 0.008 0.014* 0.008 0.014* 0.008 
Urban     -0.015 0.021 -0.017 0.021 -0.017 0.021 -0.019 0.021 
Education     0.012** 0.006 0.011* 0.006 0.011* 0.006 0.010 0.006 
Media consumption     0.006* 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 
Democracy priority       0.178*** 0.063 0.177*** 0.063 0.184*** 0.063 
Civil-political human rights       0.006** 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Infrastructure priority       -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.013 -0.004 0.013 
Donor influence       0.051** 0.020 0.051** 0.020 0.052** 0.020 
Country-level             
GDP per capita         0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diplomatic ties         0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Democracy score         -0.030** 0.014 -0.029* 0.016 
             
Random Part             
Residual variance 0.983*** 0.013 0.982*** 0.013 0.981*** 0.013 0.980*** 0.013 0.980*** 0.013 0.977*** 0.013 
Random intercept 0.054*** 0.018 0.054*** 0.018 0.051*** 0.017 0.051*** 0.017 0.040*** 0.014 0.064*** 0.024 
Random MediaConsumption           0.000** 0.000 
ICC 0.052 0.052 0.049 0.049 0.039 0.061 
Deviance 33166.531  33162.373  33147.174  33127.762  33123.288  33103.116  
N countries = 19, N respondents = 11,736 
(* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01)
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Model 4 introduces several relation-specific characteristics. The dummy ‘democracy priority’ 
captures whether respondents regard democracy as one of the top three problems their government 
should address. ‘Civil-political human rights’ indicates to what extent the respondent finds freedom of 
organization, press and expression desirable. ‘Influence donors’ is a dummy that takes the value of one 
for respondents who expressed that international donors and NGOs have too much influence over their 
government. Finally, ‘infrastructure priority’ captures the extent to which the development of 
infrastructure (transportation, communications, roads, electricity and water supply) are considered 
among the top three priorities for the government. It is hypothesized that respondents who attach 
major importance to democracy and to civil and political human rights will be more pro-EU. In 
contrast, Africans who prioritize infrastructure development and who feel donors have too much 
influence are expected to be more favourable towards China. The inclusion of these variables is thus 
aimed at determining whether preferences are also influenced by the more abstract development 
discourses of China and the EU.  
 
The findings show that this indeed seems to be the case. Respondents who name democracy as a top 
priority for their country are significantly more pro-EU than those who do not. This observation is 
further backed by the (somewhat weaker) relationship between support for civil and political human 
rights and a more pro-EU stance. China’s approach to development co-operation, in contrast, is less 
clearly reflected in the perceptions of Africans. Views on donor influence are found to be related to 
perceptions of the EU and China but, contrary to expectations, respondents who find international 
donors and NGO’s have too much influence over their government are less, not more, in favour of 
China. Respondents who express a greater need for infrastructure development are not significantly 
more pro-China than others. 
 
Model 5 subsequently brings in three characteristics at the country level, in an attempt to explain part 
of the country-level variance. Two of these variables, GDP per capita and ‘democracy score’ 
(measured on a 15-point scale by the Polity IV Project), are general characteristics of a country. The 
variable ‘diplomatic ties’ is relation-specific, capturing for how many years each country had had 
diplomatic ties with China up to 2008. This variable, which varies from just one year in the case of 
Malawi to 48 years in the case of Mali, is used here as a proxy for the strength of the historical 
relationship with China. The results indicate that differences in average preferences between African 
countries are not significantly related to differences in level of economic development, nor to 
variations in the historical ties with China. In contrast, the level of democracy does appear to play a 
role, with attitudes being significantly more pro-EU in less democratic countries. Like the highly 
significant effect of support to democracy at the individual level, this may indicate an awareness of the 
focus on democracy in the EU’s development discourse. 
 
In Model 6, the influence of media consumption is allowed to vary over countries, to reflect the fact 
that media messages may be more pro-China in some countries and more pro-EU in others. While the 
inclusion of this random term significantly improves the fit of the model, the parameter estimate 
indicates that the variance in the effect of media consumption is very small. Finally, it should also be 
noted that the overall decrease in residual variance throughout the series of models is limited, 
indicating that substantial explanatory work remains to be done. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has argued that the burgeoning literature on external perceptions of the EU is in need of a 
comparative perspective, as well as a stronger focus on explanation. In an attempt to fill these gaps, it 
focused on the neglected region of Sub-Saharan Africa. To guide the analysis, an explanatory 
framework was introduced that combines arguments from analyses of African perceptions of China 
with insights from the broader literature on ‘traditional’ versus ‘emerging’ development partners. Two 
key aspects were highlighted: the distinction between general and relation-specific characteristics, and 
the issue of multiple levels of explanation. The latter in particular indicated that existing work on EU 
external perceptions, which is strongly empirically driven, needs to be complemented by a more 
thorough reflection on the origin and nature of perceptions. 
 
The exploration of Afrobarometer data from 19 countries indicated that, first, the EU is not very well 
known among Sub-Saharan African populations. China has succeeded in achieving a clearer profile in 
almost all countries in the study, and has done this in a very limited amount of time. Despite its longer 
engagement, the EU is struggling in terms of its visibility. Second, the EU enjoys broad-based support 
as a development partner, but so does China. Third, African evaluations of EU versus Chinese support 
do not at all reflect the antagonistic representations that are dominant in much of the scholarly 
literature. African populations appear to see engagement by traditional and emerging development 
partners as complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  
 
The final section presented an application of the explanatory framework. The findings do not support 
past claims that popular perceptions of development partners mainly mirror national-level variables, 
indicating instead that preferences are a function primarily of individual experiences and outlooks. 
Differences in perceptions between countries, while relatively limited, do remain significant. On the 
individual level, both general characteristics of respondents and relation-specific attitudes were found 
to have an impact. While women and more highly educated Africans are more pro-EU, the impact of 
socio-economic status on preferences is complex and in need of further exploration. Interestingly, the 
EU’s insistence on democratic development seems to be recognized by African public opinion, as 
those who attach greater importance to democracy and civil-political human rights express a 
significantly stronger preference for the EU. 
 
To conclude, a number of avenues for future research can be indicated. First, it would be highly 
interesting to study how perceptions have evolved since 2008. The data analysed here capture African 
popular perceptions of the Chinese engagement at a fairly early stage. Perceptions of China may since 
have improved (as results of cooperation have further materialised) or deteriorated (due to perceived 
negative effects). For the EU, the Eurozone crisis may have impacted negatively on external 
perceptions, as has been demonstrated for other regions (e.g. Chaban & Magdalina, 2014). 
Unfortunately, such a longitudinal analysis of African popular perceptions is not possible at the 
moment, due to the unavailability of more recent survey data. A second avenue for future research lies 
in further study of EU external perceptions in crucial yet neglected regions, such as the southern and 
eastern neighbours. This geographical focus should be complemented by a comparative approach, 
relating external perceptions of the EU to those of other salient international actors in each particular 
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context. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the analytical underpinnings of external perceptions 
research deserve much stronger attention. A solid conceptual and explanatory framework, for which 
this article has sought to indicate a number of key dimensions, is not only vital for gaining deeper 
insight into external images of specific international actors, but also for exploring the opportunities 
and limits of this field of study.  
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